How soon people have forgotten that, earlier this year, the US dispatched two carrier strike groups and a half-dozen B-2s (and other USAF assets) to disarm the Yemeni and open the selectively blockaded Red Sea.
They failed. Abysmally. For the second time!
First of all, in 2024, the USS Brave Sir Robin (CVN-69), USS Teddy Bear (CVN-71), and USS Fraidy Abe (CVN-72) gave it a try, only to eventually run away with their tail between their legs. The Brave Sir Robin left behind an F/A-18 at the bottom of the sea.
They were followed up by the USS Trembling Puppy (CVN-75) and the USS Timid Vinny (CVN-70). But they fared no better, with the Trembling Puppy losing two additional F/A-18 fighters over the course of its traumatic tour of the northern Red Sea.
And, not only did the Yemeni increase their score of MQ-9 Reaper drones to 23, they also targeted and credibly threatened both F-35s and B-2s, such that both platforms were summarily withdrawn from the fight for fear of one getting shot down.
Remember, Yemen is absolutely the bottom rung on the escalatory ladder of formidable adversaries.
Anyone who seriously believes the US Navy can operate in Iranian waters is just plain delusional.
Even if no ships got damaged or sunk, they'd still run out of munitions in a couple weeks or less — and they sure as hell won't be able to reload in Bahrain.
As for an air campaign ... well, I have yet to see any persuasive evidence that US/Israeli aircraft penetrated Iranian airspace to any appreciable extent in Act I of this war. Consequently, I am dubious that Iranian medium- and long-range air defenses were even used.
There is also zero credible evidence of top-shelf Iranian air defenses being destroyed.
From all indications, the Iranians were shooting down Israel's big strike drones with short-range AD. And they shot down several.
The Israeli long-range air-launched ballistic missiles were apparently effective, but they simply don't have very many of them, and as the war progressed into its second week, we saw fewer and fewer of them with each passing day.
In any case, when Act II of this war gets started (and it won't be long), it will almost certainly entail penetration of Iranian airspace. And we will see not only the emergence of Iranian long-range AD, but I strongly suspect Russian and/or Chinese mobile air defense systems will suddenly appear on the battlefield.
Those whose calculus of a US/Iran war assumes overwhelming American air superiority will abruptly find the parameters of their equations altered.
The Russians and Chinese are not going to stand idly by and watch the US smash up their important southwest Asia ally in the rapidly emerging multipolar world.
And keep in mind: the US simply cannot logistically sustain a high-intensity air campaign for more than 2-3 weeks. And if even a dozen or so manned US aircraft are shot down, and a couple ships severely damaged ... well, that will cause such overwhelming consternation in Washington that it might even result in a coup d'état, or something closely approximating one.
Read William Schryver in Substack.
They failed. Abysmally. For the second time!
First of all, in 2024, the USS Brave Sir Robin (CVN-69), USS Teddy Bear (CVN-71), and USS Fraidy Abe (CVN-72) gave it a try, only to eventually run away with their tail between their legs. The Brave Sir Robin left behind an F/A-18 at the bottom of the sea.
They were followed up by the USS Trembling Puppy (CVN-75) and the USS Timid Vinny (CVN-70). But they fared no better, with the Trembling Puppy losing two additional F/A-18 fighters over the course of its traumatic tour of the northern Red Sea.
And, not only did the Yemeni increase their score of MQ-9 Reaper drones to 23, they also targeted and credibly threatened both F-35s and B-2s, such that both platforms were summarily withdrawn from the fight for fear of one getting shot down.
Remember, Yemen is absolutely the bottom rung on the escalatory ladder of formidable adversaries.
Anyone who seriously believes the US Navy can operate in Iranian waters is just plain delusional.
Even if no ships got damaged or sunk, they'd still run out of munitions in a couple weeks or less — and they sure as hell won't be able to reload in Bahrain.
As for an air campaign ... well, I have yet to see any persuasive evidence that US/Israeli aircraft penetrated Iranian airspace to any appreciable extent in Act I of this war. Consequently, I am dubious that Iranian medium- and long-range air defenses were even used.
There is also zero credible evidence of top-shelf Iranian air defenses being destroyed.
From all indications, the Iranians were shooting down Israel's big strike drones with short-range AD. And they shot down several.
The Israeli long-range air-launched ballistic missiles were apparently effective, but they simply don't have very many of them, and as the war progressed into its second week, we saw fewer and fewer of them with each passing day.
In any case, when Act II of this war gets started (and it won't be long), it will almost certainly entail penetration of Iranian airspace. And we will see not only the emergence of Iranian long-range AD, but I strongly suspect Russian and/or Chinese mobile air defense systems will suddenly appear on the battlefield.
Those whose calculus of a US/Iran war assumes overwhelming American air superiority will abruptly find the parameters of their equations altered.
The Russians and Chinese are not going to stand idly by and watch the US smash up their important southwest Asia ally in the rapidly emerging multipolar world.
And keep in mind: the US simply cannot logistically sustain a high-intensity air campaign for more than 2-3 weeks. And if even a dozen or so manned US aircraft are shot down, and a couple ships severely damaged ... well, that will cause such overwhelming consternation in Washington that it might even result in a coup d'état, or something closely approximating one.
Read William Schryver in Substack.