Maxar Satellite Imagery collected on the morning of June 22 shows extensive damage at the Fordo underground complex. Several large craters are visible across the ridge, and a wide area is covered in grey-blue ash, consistent with airstrike aftermath. / Satellite image (c) 2025 Maxar Technologies.
I have been told that the destruction of Iran’s cache of enriched uranium at Fordo, a secluded base tucked into a mountainside 120 miles south of Tehran, has been at the top of the American and Israeli governments’ target list since the last few months of the Biden administration. The Israeli question was: how to get to and destroy the storage site and the high-end centrifuges spinning away 260 to 300 feet below the surface.
A White House team working closely with Israelis struggled with that issue throughout the first months of the Trump administration. Everyone involved supported the Israeli insistence that Fordo had to be eliminated. The solution that became policy—blockading any entrance to the nuclear site—arose because one member of the secret group remembered what he had learned, perhaps in college, about Schliemann’s Trench in Turkey.
Heinrich Schliemann was a wealthy German amateur archeologist who spent nearly twenty years in the late nineteenth century trying to find the ruins of Troy. He was convinced they were buried in the hills near Hissarlik, Turkey. Stymied by rocks and debris at his immediate target, he carved a huge 56-foot-deep and 230-foot-wide gash in the side of an adjacent hill until he hit bedrock. In the process he destroyed much of what turned out to be part of the original walls of Troy.
The member of the joint American-Israeli study group brought Schliemann’s folly to his colleagues. Why not deal with the buried Israeli nuclear materials not by trying to bomb the working site—even the US’s feared bunker-buster bombs would not be effective at the depth of the nuclear complex at Fordo—but by repeatedly striking the entrances and air holes there until there could be no way in or out. In other words, avoid an attack plan that had little chance of working and instead seal the Iranian centrifuges and the store of enriched uranium.
Studies at the time demonstrated that US bunker busters, even if precisely targeted, could not get within 60 feet of the depth needed. As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran was accurately reporting the constantly growing amount of uranium enriched to 60 percent—now fixed at 900 pounds—that was generated and stored at Fordo. Twenty pounds of uranium enriched to 90 percent is enough for one bomb. It would take days, not weeks, at Fordo to enrich its uranium from 60 percent to weapons grade.
It was finally decided the US armada of bombers and attack planes, when it did get the presidential order to attack, would not try to penetrate Iran’s nuclear enrichment area but would aim its bunker busters—at least thirteen of them—at the mountain. All of the known entry ways and air tubes that reached above ground were directly targeted, leaving a huge amount of rubble above the working levels that would be nearly impossible to penetrate.
None of the US bombs was meant to strike the enriched-uranium storage facility or the centrifuges spinning away. The measure of success came later when American sensors reported no increase in the atmospheric radiation levels after the attack. Iran’s uranium was intact and simply buried.
America’s newspapers and cable news shows have been filled with reports, said to be based on a five-page preliminary after-action analysis by the Defense Intelligence Agency, stating that Iran's nuclear capability was perhaps not eliminated by the US raid, but only set back for several months. The DIA’s analysis, if cited correctly, is impossible to credit simply because the total isolation at Fordo of Iran's only known supply of enriched uranium means that the ability to fabricate a nuclear warhead, if Iran’s leadership chose to do so, has been grievously impaired. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium may be intact, but it will be impossible to reach for many years, if ever. The US bunker-busters accomplished their mission at Fordo.
At no time, I was told, was the US bombing assault aimed at elements of the Iranian leadership. It was not a decapitation mission, but a modern version of Schliemann’s attempt to reach the hidden remains of Troy by coming at them from what he thought would be an easier and much safer access point. Only this time the folly was intentional.
I was told that some members of the Israeli delegation to the talks had second thoughts almost immediately about the fact that the centrifuges and enriched uranium would be left untouched by the US strike. How could Washington be sure that in some future moment the Iranians wouldn’t find a way to burrow through the rocks and debris and reach the stored uranium? Everyone involved was aware that enriched uranium would take hundreds of millions of years to decay to the point where it’s no longer radioactive.
The Israelis cited the famed rescue of thirty-three miners in Chile who were trapped nearly half a mile underground in 2010 for sixty-nine days when a copper and gold mine collapsed. The world was entranced as the miners were brought to the surface, one by one, in a specially designed capsule. It took weeks of preparation before a rescue shaft was created. Even NASA was brought in to consult.
The Israeli question was obvious: the US attack plan would leave the vital Iranian nuclear complex intact, but locked in, presumably for eons. But couldn’t a future Iranian team find a way to burrow its way through the debris, reach the stored uranium, and recover enough for one or two bombs. If Chile could find a way, why not Iran?
I was told that the Israelis asked the Trump administration “just how much was America committed to keeping [the enriched uranium] underground?” The Israeli concern increased as Trump was pushing, without immediate success, for permanent ceasefire talks.
What it will take for Trump to want peace talks may not be enough for Israel—especially because the Israelis may have their own interpretation of the message of Schliemann’s Trench: Be sure to let the dead stay buried.
A White House team working closely with Israelis struggled with that issue throughout the first months of the Trump administration. Everyone involved supported the Israeli insistence that Fordo had to be eliminated. The solution that became policy—blockading any entrance to the nuclear site—arose because one member of the secret group remembered what he had learned, perhaps in college, about Schliemann’s Trench in Turkey.
Heinrich Schliemann was a wealthy German amateur archeologist who spent nearly twenty years in the late nineteenth century trying to find the ruins of Troy. He was convinced they were buried in the hills near Hissarlik, Turkey. Stymied by rocks and debris at his immediate target, he carved a huge 56-foot-deep and 230-foot-wide gash in the side of an adjacent hill until he hit bedrock. In the process he destroyed much of what turned out to be part of the original walls of Troy.
The member of the joint American-Israeli study group brought Schliemann’s folly to his colleagues. Why not deal with the buried Israeli nuclear materials not by trying to bomb the working site—even the US’s feared bunker-buster bombs would not be effective at the depth of the nuclear complex at Fordo—but by repeatedly striking the entrances and air holes there until there could be no way in or out. In other words, avoid an attack plan that had little chance of working and instead seal the Iranian centrifuges and the store of enriched uranium.
Studies at the time demonstrated that US bunker busters, even if precisely targeted, could not get within 60 feet of the depth needed. As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran was accurately reporting the constantly growing amount of uranium enriched to 60 percent—now fixed at 900 pounds—that was generated and stored at Fordo. Twenty pounds of uranium enriched to 90 percent is enough for one bomb. It would take days, not weeks, at Fordo to enrich its uranium from 60 percent to weapons grade.
It was finally decided the US armada of bombers and attack planes, when it did get the presidential order to attack, would not try to penetrate Iran’s nuclear enrichment area but would aim its bunker busters—at least thirteen of them—at the mountain. All of the known entry ways and air tubes that reached above ground were directly targeted, leaving a huge amount of rubble above the working levels that would be nearly impossible to penetrate.
None of the US bombs was meant to strike the enriched-uranium storage facility or the centrifuges spinning away. The measure of success came later when American sensors reported no increase in the atmospheric radiation levels after the attack. Iran’s uranium was intact and simply buried.
America’s newspapers and cable news shows have been filled with reports, said to be based on a five-page preliminary after-action analysis by the Defense Intelligence Agency, stating that Iran's nuclear capability was perhaps not eliminated by the US raid, but only set back for several months. The DIA’s analysis, if cited correctly, is impossible to credit simply because the total isolation at Fordo of Iran's only known supply of enriched uranium means that the ability to fabricate a nuclear warhead, if Iran’s leadership chose to do so, has been grievously impaired. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium may be intact, but it will be impossible to reach for many years, if ever. The US bunker-busters accomplished their mission at Fordo.
At no time, I was told, was the US bombing assault aimed at elements of the Iranian leadership. It was not a decapitation mission, but a modern version of Schliemann’s attempt to reach the hidden remains of Troy by coming at them from what he thought would be an easier and much safer access point. Only this time the folly was intentional.
I was told that some members of the Israeli delegation to the talks had second thoughts almost immediately about the fact that the centrifuges and enriched uranium would be left untouched by the US strike. How could Washington be sure that in some future moment the Iranians wouldn’t find a way to burrow through the rocks and debris and reach the stored uranium? Everyone involved was aware that enriched uranium would take hundreds of millions of years to decay to the point where it’s no longer radioactive.
The Israelis cited the famed rescue of thirty-three miners in Chile who were trapped nearly half a mile underground in 2010 for sixty-nine days when a copper and gold mine collapsed. The world was entranced as the miners were brought to the surface, one by one, in a specially designed capsule. It took weeks of preparation before a rescue shaft was created. Even NASA was brought in to consult.
The Israeli question was obvious: the US attack plan would leave the vital Iranian nuclear complex intact, but locked in, presumably for eons. But couldn’t a future Iranian team find a way to burrow its way through the debris, reach the stored uranium, and recover enough for one or two bombs. If Chile could find a way, why not Iran?
I was told that the Israelis asked the Trump administration “just how much was America committed to keeping [the enriched uranium] underground?” The Israeli concern increased as Trump was pushing, without immediate success, for permanent ceasefire talks.
What it will take for Trump to want peace talks may not be enough for Israel—especially because the Israelis may have their own interpretation of the message of Schliemann’s Trench: Be sure to let the dead stay buried.